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You may click on the headlines to go to the story or scroll---
Headlines---
“Fin
Pac” IPO “in a few weeks”
Industry
Leader Ron Caruso on “ SILO”
Hansabank
to Expand Russian Operation
Exchange
Rate: Europe Should Be Buying U.S.
Business
Leasing News May Edition
Atlas
America Completes Public Offering
Doug
Cain joins GMAC Equip. Finance
Donna
M. Wesemann Sales Manager
Ameritrans
Reports Loss Fiscal Year 2004 3rd Q
Jetworks
Formed by Industry Veteran
Charter
One New Healthcare Finance Initiative
######## surrounding the article denotes it is a “press
release”
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classified
Ads---Credit
Credit: Atlanta,
GA. VP Credit/Operations/Sr. Credit Officer. 15yrs exp. in equipment
leasing. Strong financial analysis and management skills. Experience
developing and maintaining profitable customer/vendor relationships.
Email:credops@msn.com
Credit: Atlanta,
GA.
Senior Credit Officer
in middle-market equip. finance, vendor, 3rd party, specialty, flow
credit to the fortune 1000. Team builder, originations capable, strong
work ethic, ability to multi-task. Email: kyletrust@hotmail.com
Credit: Atlanta,
GA.
10 yrs experience
in
credit/collections/recovery/documentation
in the leasing industry. P&L responsibility,
team builder &
strong portfolio mgnt skills. email: mortimerga@adelphia.net
Credit: Boston
Ma.
Challenging position
where my skills, professional experience, organization, leadership,
strategic thinking, creativity, energy, passion, competitive nature
will enable me to define opportunities and personal development. Email:
bernd.janet@verizon.net
Credit: Corona,
CA.
VP credit Consumer
Credit prime/sub prime Auto lending/leasing/mortgages. 20+yrs exp. If
you are looking for someone to affect the bottom line I am that person.
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email: vgjmoro@aol.com
Credit/Documentation:
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3 Years Experience.
Looking in NJ/NY. Email: angitravis@mail.com
Credit: Long
Beach, NY. Credit officer w/more
than 20 years of
experience. Seeking position in which I can utilize my credit-collections,
communication &management skills. Email:michaelschaubeck@webtv.net
Credit: Los
Angeles, CA
Over 15 years experience
in Credit/Operations with Small Ticket and transactions up to $500,000.00.
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Credit: Mill
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Senior corporate
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Credit: New
Jersey, NJ
Credit Analyst with
10+ years experience in small-ticket lending up to $500,000. Experience
with both vendor-direct and with brokers.
Email: b.leavy@worldnet.att.net
Credit: New
York, NY
3+ years of leasing
credit / contracts experience. Currently in the leasing industry and
moving to NY! Exp. working at both funding source and broker.
Email: lease4you@mail.com
Credit: New
York, NY.
V.P. Credit &
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& leasing. Email:rcouzzi@yahoo.com
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Credit: Phoenix,
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Worked with the best- Randy Schiell, Chuck Brazier, Jim Lahti.
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Credit: San
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a direct lessor, regional bank and vendor leasing company. Have CLP
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Credit Manager:
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7+ years Credit/Underwriting experience Comp lit. Please email me for copy of job description at
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic
Events This Week
May 19
Wednesday
Balance of Trade:
March
Federal Budget: April
May 20
Thursday
Producer Prices:
April
Retail Sales: April
Weekly Jobless Claims
May 21
Friday
Inventory-Sales Ratio:
March
Capacity Use: April
Consumer Price Index:
April
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
“Fin
Pac” IPO “in a few weeks”
The
$80.50 Financial Pacific Leasing IPO offering will be “ in a few weeks,
as soon as it received SEC clearance, “ according to a spokesperson
for Piper Jaffray , 800 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402,
or by telephone at 800-333-6000 , one of the agents where you may obtain
a prospectus.
Located
in Federal Way, close to Tacoma, Washington, the company known in the
trade as “Fin Pac,” has a unique market place with over 450 broker nationwide
in the small ticket market place, specializing in unusual equipment,
situations such as working from your home, and not seeking direct or
vendor business.
A
full story is available at:
http://www.leasingnews.org/Conscious-Top%20Stories/Fin_pac_prosp_avail.htm
Accounting
 Accounting: PricewaterhouseCoopers seeks executives with experience in equipment leasing to help clients improve their leasing businesses by assessing "as is" conditions and designing and implementing solutions to operational issues. PwC also seeks CPA's with a broad based knowledge of FAS13 and familiarity with accounting for leases with simple and complex transaction structures. Email: anthony.g.anderson@us.pwc.com About the Company: PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York, NY. |
Industry Leader Ron Caruso on “ SILO”
By: Ron Caruso, Equipment Finance Journal
For a period of time,
the leasing industry has been in the sights of Congress. We have been
painted with the same brush used to tar and feather the likes of Tyco,
WorldCom, Enron, et.al. Not
the type of company your mother would like you to be keeping. We’ve
been branded as the purveyors of scam transactions that rip off the
U.S. taxpayer. With the fury of the righteous, Congress is about to
take action vowing to put an end to all of this so-called abuse.
Just coincidentally,
they are also attempting to enact a new budget. Unfortunately, every
time they add up the amount they project for revenues, it falls short (far short) of the amount they project for
expenditures. What can they do? Well,
they can look for additional sources of revenue, such as closing the
so-called loopholes that were used by the leasing industry. By doing
this, they will prevent the continued abuse (in their eyes) perpetrated
by certain members of the leasing fraternity, perhaps even allow certain
provisos to be retroactive to punish the offenders and generate the
additional revenue they need. Sounds like a win-win proposition, right?
Well, not exactly.
To begin with, the
invective hurled at the leasing industry and the characterizations (ENRON-like,etc.)
are without merit. True, there were some uses of the tax code that caused
indignation, especially when applied to assets used by foreign municipalities,
but now “owned” for tax purposes by U.S. corporations, resulting in
U.S. tax benefits. However, unlike the companies mentioned above, no
crimes were committed, and no indictments were issued. Is this distinction
too subtle?
The reality is the
tax code was stretched and if Congress has a problem with that, the
answer is all too obvious: change the tax code. But in doing that be
careful you don’t kill the golden goose, or in this case, our still
recovering economy. The measures being considered by Congress to curb
this abuse and punish the abusers range from significant to draconian.
It’s time to get off the soap box, calm down and think and act with
a little more detachment.
Big ticket leasing
has helped a number of companies and municipalities and provided a significant
lift to our economy. Lessors in this market segment have taken their
lumps as well. All one has to do is look at all the airplanes parked
in the desert to appreciate this. It can continue to provide a significant
amount of financing for new equipment.
This is important, given where the economy is currently, and
where new capital expenditures are not. Yes, business is increasing
its expenditures for IT and related hardware/software. But new investment
in other types of equipment is still lagging. At a stage when corporate
profits are rebounding, consumers continue to spend and employment is
on an up tick, caution must be exercised.
What
is vital at this time is leadership from our government. Someone needs
to be the voice of reason and detachment, and bring the disparate parties
together, to work together, to find a solution that benefits all. Will
this happen? Well until the shouting dies down, such a voice has little
chance of being heard. Stay tuned.
( to subscribe, please go to: www.efj.com )
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gym
Leasing Ponzi Scheme
Minnesota Attorney
General Mike Hatch has accused Cameron J. Lewis
of operating a pyramid scheme by using money from newly enlisted
schools - not grants or donations - to make token reimbursements to
schools that signed up early to buy or lease fitness equipment. Many
of the schools were left unable to pay off bank loans or satisfy leasing
terms.
600 schools in 20
states reportedly bought $77.5 million worth of weight machines, treadmills
and other equipment with much of it
leased from various
leasing companies.
Cameron set up a
foundation with the promise that private donations or government grants
would cover the cost of the equipment or
the lease payments.
Chris Essman, treasurer
for Bexley City Schools in Ohio says the school district has received
$70,000 in reimbursements. It still owes over $140,000 in lease payments
on the equipment.
An investigation
by The Associated Press reveals Lewis has had a string of failed businesses,
a history of personal bankruptcy and used his nonprofit foundation to
give himself a $317,358 salary.
According to AP,
Lewis makes for an unlikely philanthropist; he claims to have poured
$1.6 million of his own money into the foundation. But when filing for
bankruptcy in 1996, he listed $6,840 in assets, including a six-year-old
Isuzi truck and an electric guitar, with nearly $20,000 in liabilities.
Tax returns for the
National School Fitness Foundation reportedly show Lewis was collecting
a $317,358 salary, but he claims that salary covered the foundation's
first two years. He said his present
income from the foundation
is $185,000 per year plus expenses.
Francine Giani, director
of Utah's Consumer Protection Division, is
Utah schools have
filed no complaints, ``which makes our job a little more tasking,''
she added.
Lewis, meanwhile,
told the Associated Press he was committed to improving the lives of
overweight school kids by providing exercise machines and a training
regimen.
``The sad thing is
that many kids are obese and the likelihood they can get past that in
adolescence is slim to none. It's a sad, sad fact,'' he told AP. ``Here
we've got a program that really works.''
On the Net:
National School Fitness
Foundation: http://www.nsff.net
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
RW
Professional Up-Date
4/6/04 all counsel
to agree on jurors who will return for Jury Selection. Jury Selection
4/12/04 @ 9:00 a.m. Consent to Magistrate Judge selecting jury by dfts
and govt. No adjournments of Jury Selection date will be granted
WestLaw
United States District
Court,
E.D. New York.
UNITED STATES of
America,
v.
RW PROFESSIONAL LEASING
SERVICES CORP., also known as "Professional Leasing Services,"
Rochelle Besser, also known as "Rochelle Drayer," Barry Drayer,
Roger Drayer, Adam Drayer, Susan Cottrell, Myrna Katz, and Stephen Barker,
Defendants.
No. 02 CV 767(ADS)(MLO).
May 4, 2004.
Background: Defendants
were charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud and
money laundering. Defendants filed various pretrial motions.
Holdings: The District
Court, Spatt, J., held that:
(1) defendants were
entitled to suppression hearing on claim that third
party acted as government agent in seizing items;
(2) defendant was
entitled to hearing on claim that officers coerced
statements by threatening to arrest members of his family;
(3) defendant invoked
Fifth Amendment right to counsel;
(4) Bruton did not
require exclusion of statements at joint trial;
(5) evidence relating
to acts of alleged co-conspirator was relevant to
conspiracy counts;
(6) defendant was
not entitled to severance of trials; and
(7) defendants were
not entitled to bill of particulars.
Motions granted in part and denied in part.
In prosecution for
conspiracies to commit bank and wire fraud and to launder money, which
involved obtaining loans under false pretenses from bank, defendants
would not be granted bill of particulars detailing which allegedly fraudulent
schemes corresponded to which loans, explaining how loss figures were
calculated, or stating where proceeds of each loan were secreted, as
such level of detail was neither required nor necessary to prepare defense.
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 7(f), 18 U.S.C.A.
[32]
110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
110XX(A) Preliminary
Proceedings
110k627.5 Discovery
Prior to and Incident to Trial
110k627.7 Statements,
Disclosure of
110k627.7(3) k. Statements
of Witnesses or Prospective Witnesses. Most Cited Cases
Government's representation
that it would produce statements of all prospective witnesses three
days before trial was sufficient to satisfy its obligation to produce
statements that it intended to use at trial or were relevant to defense,
such that pretrial request to compel production would be denied. Fed.Rules
Cr.Proc.Rule 16(a)(1), 18 U.S.C.A.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
AND ORDER
SPATT, District Judge.
*1 This case involves
charges of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud and money
laundering. Presently before the Court are the following motions by
RW Professional Leasing Services, Corp. ("PLS"), Rochelle
Besser, Barry Drayer, Roger Drayer, Adam Drayer, Susan Cottrell, and
Stephen Barker (collectively, the "defendants"): (1) to suppress
documents obtained directly by a confidential source referred to as
"CS-1" in the Government's search warrant application, and
any evidence seized by the Government from PLS's office; (2) to suppress
Roger Drayer's post-arrest statements; (3) to preclude evidence concerning
the alleged fraudulent loans obtained by PLS on behalf of Hospitality
Services of Middle Tennessee ("HSMT"); (4) to dismiss the
indictment with respect to defendant Adam Drayer, or alternatively,
to sever his trial; (5) for the production of all Brady and Giglio materials;
(6) for an order directing the Government to provide a bill of particulars;
and (7) for an order directing the Government to provide statements
and the grand jury testimony of PLS employees.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about April
2, 2003, along with Payaddi Shivashankar, the defendants were indicted
and charged with one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371, five counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344,
and one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1986(h). The following
facts are taken from the superseding indictment ("indictment").
PLS maintained business locations in Island Park, New York, and Wellesley,
Massachusetts. The indictment charges, in relevant part, that Rochelle
Besser, Barry Drayer, Susan Cottrell, Roger Drayer, and Roger Drayer's
son Adam Drayer (collectively, the "PLS defendants") operated
a medical equipment financing company, in which they arranged financing
for the leasing of medical equipment by medical providers and supplied
medical providers with working capital loans. PLS obtained loans from
financial institutions for the purported purpose of purchasing medical
equipment that would be leased to medical providers. In many instances,
the leases and the medical equipment served as collateral for the loans.
The indictment charges
that PLS devised a scheme to provide the financial institutions with
sham documentation creating the false impression that the medical providers
were leasing equipment from PLS and that PLS issued phony equipment
invoices directly to the medical providers for payments due under the
lease. The indictment further charges that the PLS defendants, among
other things: (1) intentionally retained lease prepayments, rather than
remitting them to the financial institutions; (2) concealed prepayments
and defaults by medical providers by creating false checks that were
designed to make it appear as though the medical providers were continuing
to make payments under the leases; (3) fraudulently induced lenders
to fund multiple loans on the basis of a single lease; (4) obtained
loans from lenders on the basis of leases that had been cancelled by
medical providers; (5) presented escrow agreements to banks to induce
them to fund loans, knowing that escrow accounts would not be established
and no funds would be held in escrow for the banks; and (6) converted
loan proceeds to PLS's own use.
*2 The indictment
provides that, instead of establishing escrow accounts for the leases
being financed by the financial institutions as required by the escrow
agreements, PLS maintained one bank account that received approximately
$92 million in loan proceeds wired by the lending institutions, and
a second bank account known as the "E-Account," which was
used by PLS as an operating account to receive lease payments and lease
prepayments from the medical providers and for other purposes. The bank
account and the E-Account were maintained by PLS at the same financial
institution.
After the loan proceeds
were wired into the first account, they were transferred by PLS into
the E-Account, where they were commingled with lease payments and lease
prepayments. Instead of using the loan proceeds for the purchase of
medical equipment, as PLS had promised to do, the PLS defendants converted
a substantial portion of the loan proceeds to their own uses. In particular,
the commingled funds were transferred by check or wire from the E- Account
to (1) pay financial obligations of PLS; (2) make lease payments in
order to conceal the medical providers' default status from lenders;
and (3) another account maintained by PLS in order to disguise the proceeds
and facilitate their conversions. The indictment states that the PLS
defendants fraudulently converted at least the sum of $28 million.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Suppress
all Evidence obtained by "CS-1"
The defendants identify
a confidential source ("CS-1") as former PLS employee Frank
Zambaras. They argue that Zambaras acted as a de facto Government agent
and that, therefore, all items seized by him and all evidence derived
from those items, including items seized pursuant to the search warrant,
should be suppressed. Alternatively, the defendants request an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Zambaras acted as a Government instrument
or agent.
[1][2] The Fourth
Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
It is well-settled that the "surreptitious search of premises by
a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment" unless such
individual is acting as an instrument or agent of the government in
obtaining evidence. United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 805 (2d
Cir.1983). The Supreme Court has made clear that it is " 'immaterial'
whether the government originated the idea for a search or joined it
while it was in progress." United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313,
1320 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79,
69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)). If the government " 'was
in it before the object of the search was completely accomplished [by
the private party, it] must be deemed to have participated in it .'
" Id. (quoting Lustig, 338 U.S. at 78-79)). Thus, the critical
issue is "the point in time when the object of the search has been
completed. If the object has been realized, the government cannot later
become a party to it. By the same token, it may not expand the scope
of an ongoing private search unless it has an independent right to do
so." Id.
*3 An evidentiary
hearing on a motion to suppress "ordinarily is required if the
moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, and nonconjectural
to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going
to the validity of the search are in question." United States v.
Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir.1992) (citations and quotations omitted).
A defendant seeking a hearing on a suppression motion bears the burden
of showing the existence of disputed issues of material fact. See id.
at 338. However, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing if the defendant's "moving papers did not state sufficient
facts which, if proven, would have required the granting of the relief
requested." United States v. Culotta, 413 F.2d 1343, 1349 (2d Cir.1969).
Further, a court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the "defendant's
allegations are general and conclusory or are based on suspicion and
conjecture." United States v. Wallace, No. 97 CR 975, 1998 WL 10874,
at *30 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998) (citation omitted).
[3] According to
the defendants, the circumstances surrounding the recovery of items
by Zambaras from the PLS office "lead to the conclusion that the
FBI directed or at least encouraged the actions of Zambaras in his surreptitious
search and seizure of such items." The defendants point out that,
in a June 20, 2002 complaint and affidavit, Agent Rondie Peiscop-Grau
stated that Zambaras "has been supplying the [Government] with
information and documents" about PLS's operation since on or about
June 13, 2002. Agent Peiscop-Grau further stated that Zambaras provided
a file "relating to OD-1, an optometrist from California"
and "four other files reflecting the defendants' rental of boxes
from Mail Boxes, Etc."
In addition, the
defendants assert that a photocopy of a property receipt reveals that
Zambaras provided several items to the Government on June 18, 2002,
three days prior to the arrest of Barry Drayer, Rochelle Besser and
Roger Drayer. The defendants also contend that a photocopy of a computer
disk appears to show that, at some point, Zambaras provided the Government
with an actual computer disk containing copies of RW checks. The defendants
state that this disk was not generated by any of the PLS defendants.
Based on this, the defendants contend that the computer disk and the
other documents were seized by Zambaras without PLS's authorization
and with the knowledge of the Government.
Further, the defendants
state that, on or about June 13, 2002, Zambaras was terminated by PLS.
Several days later, when Zambaras was no longer on the payroll, several
PLS employees observed him at the PLS office making an "unusual"
number of photocopies. In an April 1, 2004 supplemental affidavit, Roger
Drayer states that he saw Zambaras at the photocopy machine for "several
hours." According to the defendants, Zambaras was copying and stealing
PLS files. Further, in a February 12, 2004 affidavit, Domenica Califano,
another tenant in the building in which PLS is located, asserts that
Zambaras was observed on June 21, 2002 handing the FBI agents a computer
disk and accompanying FBI agents, while a search warrant was being executed
inside the PLS office.
*4 In response, the
Government contends that there is nothing in Agent Rondie-Grau's affidavit
to suggest when, where, or how the documents supplied by Zambaras were
obtained. The Government further contends that there is no evidence
that the FBI directed or approved a private search of PLS's office.
In the Court's view,
the defendants have made a sufficient showing that contested issues
of fact exist regarding whether Zambaras was working on behalf of the
Government at the time he obtained documents. In sum, the defendants
contend that Zambaras was acting at the behest of the Government, based
on the following: (1) the language in the affidavit of Agent Peiscop-Grau
reveals that Zambaras provided the Government with information and documents
in the week preceding the search of the PLS office on June 21, 2002;
(2) Roger Drayer's observation regarding the "unusual amount"
of photocopying by Zambaras after the FBI met with him on June 13, 2002;
(3) the FBI receipt indicating Zambaras gave documents to Agent Peiscop-Grau
on June 18, 2002; (4) the copy of the computer disk that had "PLS
Checks" written upon it but was not generated by any of the PLS
defendants; and (5) the observations of an independent third- party
witness that Zambaras was actually assisting the FBI in the execution
of the search warrant. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that
an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether there was Government
involvement in Zambaras's seizure of the documents. Accordingly, United
States Magistrate Judge Michael L. Orenstein is requested to conduct
a suppression hearing with regard to this issue at his earliest convenience
and report to the Court. The Court will defer its decision on this motion
until after the determination of the suppression hearing.
B. The Motion to
Suppress Roger Drayer's Post-Arrest Statement
1. As to Voluntariness
The defendants moves
to suppress Roger Drayer's post-arrest statements made on June 21, 2002,
to FBI Agents Vincent Gerardi and Michael Lender, which were memorialized
by the agents in an FBI form 302. The defendants argue that his statements
should be suppressed on the grounds that (1) they were involuntary;
(2) they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel; and (3) admitting the statements would violate the Bruton rule.
[4] The Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination requires a court to exclude from criminal
proceedings involuntary statements produced by government threats or
coercion. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 945, 109 S.Ct. 374, 102 L.Ed.2d 363 (1988). Because custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive, see Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), law enforcement
officers must provide a suspect with Miranda warnings prior to interrogation
to safeguard a defendant's privilege against self incrimination. United
States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
850, 117 S.Ct. 140, 136 L.Ed.2d 87 (1996). Interrogation "refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
*5 [5] To determine
whether a defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights, the Court must
decide whether the waiver was made with the "full awareness of
the right being waived and of the consequences of waiving that right,"
United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir.1995), and whether
the confession or statement was the "product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception," Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).
A defendant's confession or statement "must not be extracted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion by any improper influence."
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Coercion may be found where a defendant's statement is "obtained
under circumstances that overbear the defendant's will at the time it
is given...." United States v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1999).
Whether a statement is voluntarily made or a product of government coercion
depends on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Gaines,
295 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d
235, 244-45 (2d Cir.1998)).
[6] Promises of leniency,
without more, do not invalidate a Miranda waiver. See United States
v. Guarno, 819 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1987). Although material misrepresentations
based on unfulfillable or other improper promises might overbear a defendant's
will, see United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265 (2d Cir.1995),
"a confession is not involuntary merely because the suspect was
promised leniency if he cooperated with law enforcement officials.'
" United States v. Bye, 919 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Guarno,
819 F.2d at 31)). Thus, whether promises of leniency for his children
overbore the defendant's will in this case, thereby rendering his waiver
involuntary, depends on the promises made.
[7] In the present
case, the defendants apparently concede that Miranda warnings were given.
Rather, the defendants contend that Roger Drayer's statements to the
FBI agents were involuntary. As noted above, one of the factors the
Court must consider when determining whether a statement was voluntarily
made is whether the government agents know that their conduct is reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island,
446 U.S. at 301.
According to the
defendants, when Roger Drayer was arrested, FBI agents handcuffed him
in front of his son, Adam Drayer, and warned Adam "you too are
a hair away from being arrested." Shortly thereafter, the agents
informed Roger Drayer that his daughter, Jennifer Tarantino, was also
going to be arrested that day. He was then transported to FBI headquarters
where he indicated that he would need an attorney. Before an attorney
was provided, the defendants contend that one of the FBI agents "implied"
that his children Adam Drayer and Jennifer Tarantino would go to jail
if he did not make a statement and tell them about PLS's operation.
Based on these circumstances, the defendants contend that Roger Drayer
was coerced to make a statement because of concern for his children.
*6 In response, the
Government denies that Roger Drayer's statement was the product of coercion.
Any statements made to Roger Drayer by the FBI, asserts the Government,
were in the nature of permissible and truthful advice concerning his
post-arrest circumstances.
[8][9] The Court
finds that disputed issues of fact exist regarding the circumstances
in which the Government obtained Roger Drayer's statements. A defendant's
statement that is induced by government threats to arrest members of
the suspect's family may render his statement involuntary. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544-48, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760
(1961) (finding that a confession was coerced because the defendant
was told his wife would be taken in for questioning). In the Court's
view, the defendants have advanced enough facts to demonstrate that
disputed issues of fact exist regarding whether the agents exercised
undue psychological pressure on Roger Drayer so that his will was overcome
at the time he made his statements, thereby rendering his statements
involuntary. Because the parties dispute the circumstances surrounding
Roger Drayer's statements, the Court concludes that it cannot decide
the defendants' motion to suppress Roger Drayer's statements without
an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, United States Magistrate Judge
Michael L. Orenstein is requested to conduct a suppression hearing and
report to the Court with regard to the issue of voluntariness.
2. As to his Invocation
of his Right to Counsel
Next, the defendants
argue that the statements by Roger Drayer should be suppressed because
they were elicited after he invoked his right to counsel. After Roger
Drayer was arrested, he was placed in an FBI vehicle and driven to FBI
headquarters. During the drive, one of the agents asked him if he had
an attorney, to which he responded that he "would want an attorney
appointed to me." According to the defendants, this amounted to
a Fifth Amendment invocation of counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981),
[10][11] It is well-settled
that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
the suspect, " 'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.' " United States v. Smith,
778 F.2d 925, 931-32 (2d Cir.1985) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)). Here, the Court rejects
the Government's argument that Roger Drayer's statement that he wanted
to have an attorney appointed referred to his Sixth Amendment right.
It is undisputed that this statement was made immediately after his
arrest but before arraignment. The Second Circuit has held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not arise at the time of the arrest.
Smith, 778 F.2d at 932. Because the period in question was before the
commencement of an adversary judicial proceeding, the Sixth Amendment
is not applicable.
*7 [12] Rather, the
issue turns on whether Roger Drayer's right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment was violated. As previously stated, the Fifth Amendment requires
that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, government
agents must apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney,
and to have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Edwards,
the Supreme Court held that, once the right to counsel is invoked, the
interrogation must cease until counsel is present, unless the suspect
thereafter indicates a waiver by initiating further communication with
law enforcement. 451 U.S. at 484-85. A defendant may invoke his right
to counsel "in any manner and at any stage of the process"
that counsel is desired. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
[13][14][15] Invocation
of the Fifth Amendment requires the suspect to make "some statement
that can reasonably be construed to be expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct.
2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). Reference to an attorney that is ambiguous
or equivocal is insufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to
cause law enforcement to cease their questioning. Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). In addition,
the Court is mindful that it "must give a broad, rather than a
narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel." United
States v. Quiroz, 13 F.3d 505, 511 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Indeed, any "doubts must be resolved in
favor of protecting the constitutional claim." Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986).
[16] In this case,
there is no dispute that Roger Drayer stated that he "would want
an attorney appointed for me." The Court finds that his statement
was an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of his right to and need
for counsel. His statement was sufficient to put the FBI agents on notice
that he was requesting counsel and that, therefore, they were required
to refrain from questioning him until counsel was made available to
him. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Nevertheless, this rule does not
"foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after
counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation
or discussion with the authorities." Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
U.S. 146, 156, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).
The parties dispute
whether Roger Drayer voluntarily signed a written waiver form and consented
to be interviewed. Again, the defendants assert that he was coerced
to answer questions due to his concern for his children. Because the
parties dispute whether Roger Drayer voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel, the Court will defer decision on this issue, as it
finds that a suppression hearing is necessary. Accordingly, United States
Magistrate Judge Michael L. Orenstein is requested to conduct a suppression
hearing and report to the Court with regard to the waiver issue.
3. As to the Bruton
Rule
*8 [17] Finally,
the defendants argue that Roger Drayer's statements to the FBI agents
must be precluded pursuant to the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, the
Supreme Court held that the government is prohibited from introducing
a defendant's statement at trial if it implicates a co-defendant in
a joint trial because the co-defendant would be denied his Sixth Amendment
right to confront his accuser. Id. at 128. The Supreme Court later limited
the Bruton rule, holding that the Sixth Amendment is not violated where
a proper limiting instruction is given to the jury not to consider the
statement against the non- declarant and the statement is redacted to
eliminate the co-defendant's name and any reference to his or her existence.
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176
(1987). The statement must be appropriately redacted so that it does
not in any way indicate the identity or existence of the deleted codefendant.
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294
(1998) ("we conclude that Richardson placed outside the scope of
Bruton's Rule those statements that incriminate inferentially");
see also United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir.1999) ("In
addition, the plea allocution was not incriminating on its face because
it did not directly implicate Smith. Therefore, we find no violation
of Gray.").
[18] Here, the Government
does not oppose redacting the statements as provided by Bruton, Richardson,
and Gray and does not object to a limiting instruction being given to
the jury regarding the use of the statements. Nevertheless, the defendants
argue that, because this case involves a family business, there is no
way to separate Roger Drayer's statements from the accusation against
his co-defendants. The Government contends, and the Court agrees, that
there is no rule barring the admission of a defendant's inculpatory
statement merely because some co-defendants are members of the defendant's
family. However, at this time, the Court declines to decide the potential
Bruton issues. Given the absence of a proposed redacted statement, the
Court is unable to determine whether, on its face, the redacted statement
sufficiently complies with the standards set forth in Bruton, Richardson,
and Gray. Therefore, the defendants' motion to suppress Roger Drayer's
statement on the ground that its admission would allegedly violate the
Bruton rule is denied without prejudice and with leave to renew.
C. Motion to Suppress
Evidence concerning HSMT
[19] The defendants
state that they have been charged with two counts of conspiracy: conspiracy
to commit bank fraud and wire fraud (count one) and conspiracy to commit
money laundering (count seven). The defendants contend that there will
be evidence presented at trial concerning a third conspiracy. According
to the defendants, this third conspiracy relates to allegations concerning
money funded to HSMT. The defendants assert that Payaddi Shivashankar,
an HSMT employee, is at the center of these allegations. For example,
the defendants state that, in the loan applications, Shivashankar allegedly
falsely represented that the money was to be used to finance the purchase
of medical equipment for HSMT and that the indictment alleges that the
HSMT loans contained forged signatures of doctors. The defendants contend
that the actions by Shivashankar and the HSMT partners were undertaken
independent of the PLS defendants. The defendants further contend that
there is no evidence that the PLS defendants were aware of the forged
signatures or any other misconduct on the part of Shivashankar or any
other principals or employees of HSMT. Because the indictment does not
charge this separate conspiracy, argue the defendants, all evidence
concerning the HSMT loans should be precluded at the trial.
*9 The defendants'
argument is without merit. As the Government properly points out, whether
the PLS defendants knew that Shivashankar or HSMT principals or employees
forged signatures in order to further the scheme is immaterial. See
United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 100 (2d Cir.2000) ("There
is no rule requiring the government to prove that a conspirator knew
of all criminal acts by insiders in furtherance of the conspiracy.").
In addition, the indictment here charged one conspiracy to defraud financial
institutions by obtaining financing under false pretenses and describes
a scheme in which the PLS defendants and Shivashankar agreed to achieve
that objective on behalf of HSMT. Furthermore, even assuming proof of
multiple conspiracies, generally, this is a question of fact for the
jury. United States v. Vazquez, 113 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir.1997). Accordingly,
the defendants' motion to suppress all the evidence concerning the HSMT
loans at trial is denied.
D. Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment against Adam Drayer or to Sever his Trial
[20] The defendants
move to dismiss the indictment against Adam Drayer on the ground that
"there is insufficient evidence to connect Adam Drayer to the conspiracy."
Insufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury is an insufficient
ground to dismiss a facially valid indictment. See United States v.
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1182 (2d Cir.1989) ("An indictment, if
valid on its face, may not be challenged on the ground that it is based
on inadequate evidence.").
[21] In addition,
no defects in the indictment against Adam Drayer warrant dismissal.
An indictment need only track the language of the statute charged and
state the approximate time and place of the alleged crime. See United
States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir.2000) ("We have consistently
upheld indictments that do little more than to track the language of
the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms)
of the alleged crime.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Because the indictment here more than satisfies these requirements,
the motion to dismiss the indictment against Adam Drayer is denied.
In the alternative,
pursuant to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendants argue that the Court should sever Adam Drayer's trial from
that of the remaining defendants because joint trials of these offenses
and these defendants would be severely prejudicial. In particular, the
defendants argue that, due to the familial relationships between Adam
Drayer and his co-defendants and his minor role in the alleged offenses,
severance is necessary.
[22][23] Rule 14
empowers a court to grant a severance "if it appears that a defendant
... is prejudiced by a joinder of ... defendants ... for trial together...."
Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. A court should sever trials of co-defendants under
Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise
a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or lack of guilt. Zafiro
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317
(1993); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 122 (2d Cir.1999). Even
if some prejudice is shown, Rule 14 does not require severance. See
United States v. Haynes, 16 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir.1994). Rather, "limiting
instructions often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice."
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.
*10 [24][25] The
Court finds that severance is not necessary in this case. First, "differences
in degree of guilt and possibly degree of notoriety" of defendants
do not require that there be separate trials. United States v. Aloi,
511 F.2d 585, 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S.Ct. 447,
46 L.Ed.2d 386 (1975). Indeed, "differing levels of culpability
and proof are inevitable in any multi-defendant trial and, standing
alone, are insufficient grounds for separate trials." United States
v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 367 (2d Cir.1983). Second, there is no reason
to conclude that a jury would be unable to distinguish among family
members in finding guilt or lack of guilt. Finally, even if the Court
severed Adam Drayer's trial from that of his co-defendants, much of
the evidence introduced in one trial to establish the conspiracy would
be introduced in the other. See United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315,
341 (2d Cir.1993) ("Evidence at the joint trial of alleged co-
conspirators that, because of the alleged conspiratorial nature of the
illegal activity, would have been admissible at a separate trial of
the moving defendant is neither spillover nor prejudicial."); United
States v. Muyet, 945 F.Supp. 586, 596 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ("[E]ven if
the Court were to grant severance, much of the evidence regarding ...
co-defendants' acts of violence would be admissible in ... [their] trial
as proof of the existence and nature of the conspiracy .").
Moreover, to the
extent that the evidence against one defendant may not relate to another,
the Court will either redact or issue limiting instructions to cure
any possible prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. Thus, the Court finds
that the defendants have not demonstrated the existence of a serious
risk that a joint trial will compromise a specific trial right or prevent
the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or lack of guilt.
Id.; Rahman, 189 F.3d 122. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion
by the defendants for severance as to defendant Adam Drayer.
E. Motion to Produce
Brady and Giglio Materials
[26] The defendants
move for the disclosure of all Brady and Giglio materials. The Government
acknowledges its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),
and represents that it will disclose any Brady materials when they become
known. This representation by the Government is a sufficient basis for
denying an application to compel disclosure under Brady.
[27][28] In addition,
the Government states that it will abide by its obligations to disclose
impeachment materials pursuant to Giglio v.. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The Government further
represents that it will disclose all Giglio material three days prior
to the trial. As there is no pre-trial discovery right to Giglio materials,
see United States v.. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d
1039 (1974), the Court accepts the Government's representation that
it will produce such materials three days in advance of the trial. Accordingly,
the Court denies the defendants' motion seeking disclosure of all Brady
and Giglio material.
F. Motion for a Bill
of Particulars
*11 Under Rule 7
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district court "may
direct the filing of a bill of particulars." Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(f).
A bill of particulars enables a defendant "to identify with sufficient
particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby
enabling the defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and
to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second
time for the same offense." United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d
572, 574 (2d Cir.1987) (citations omitted). In the defendants' request
for a bill of particulars, they ask the Government, among other things,
(1) to identify which allegedly fraudulent schemes correspond to which
loans; (2) to explain how the loss figures were calculated; and (3)
to state where the Government believes the proceeds of the crimes were
secreted or what documents support the Government's case with respect
to each individual allegation for each loan.
[29][30] To determine
a motion for a bill of particulars, " 'the important question is
whether the information sought is necessary, not whether it is helpful.'
" United States v. Amendolara, No. 01 CR 694, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19981, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002) (quoting United States v. Facciolo,
753 F.Supp. 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y.1990)) The decision to grant a motion
for a bill of particulars is within the sound discretion of the district
court. See United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir.1999) (citation
omitted). Where the defendant is adequately informed of the charges
against him, the Government need not particularize all of its evidence.
United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir.2000). "Acquisition
of evidentiary detail is not a function of a bill of particulars."
Id. Indeed, "[t]he proper scope and function of a bill of particulars
is not to obtain disclosure of evidence or witnesses to be offered by
the Government at trial...." United States v. Strawberry, 892 F.Supp.
519, 526 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272,
1278 (2d Cir.1973)).
[31] In this case,
the Court finds that the indictment sufficiently informs the defendants
of the nature of the charges against them, namely a conspiracy to commit
bank and wire fraud and a conspiracy to commit money laundering, thereby
enabling them to prepare a defense in this trial. Moreover, the Government
supplied a letter to the defendants, dated December 17, 2003, outlining
the specific fraudulent loans that it intends to refer to at the trial.
The Court agrees with the Government that the level of detail the defendants
seek is neither required nor necessary to enable them to prepare a defense
and avoid unfair surprise at the trial. Accordingly, the motion for
a bill of particulars is denied.
G. Motion to Provide
all Statements and Grand Jury Testimony of PLS Employees
[32] The defendants
request that the Court order the Government to produce any statements
of the defendants, including employees of PLS, in accordance with Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, the defendants
request the statements made by former employee Zambaras. Rule 16 entitles
the defendants to discovery materials that the government intends to
introduce at the trial or that is material to their defense. Fed.R.Crim.P.
16(a)(1). The Government represents that it will produce the statements
of all prospective witnesses, including Zambaras, three days prior to
the trial. The Court has no basis to conclude that the Government will
do otherwise with regard to its obligations under Rule 16. Accordingly,
based on the Government's assurance, the defendants' request to order
production of Rule 16 materials is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
*12 Based on the
foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the
defendants' motion to suppress documents obtained by Frank Zambaras
is DEFERRED, pending the outcome of the suppression hearing; and it
is further
Please note:
“ MINUTE ENTRY as to Payaddi Shivashankar (7);
Case before Judge Wall on 2/24/04 @ 11:13 a.m., for Criminal Cause for
Pleading. Dft Shivashankar present in custody with CJA counsel Edward
Jenks. Govt: Geoffrey Kaiser. CD 04-3. Dft enters plea of GUILTY to
Count One (of a seven Count) Superseding Indictment. Sentencing set
for 6/25/04 @ 9:30 a.m. before Judge Spatt. Dft remains in custody.
Magistrate Judge Wall recommends that the District Court accept the
guilty plea. (Coleman, Laurie)”
from: https://ecf.nyed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/HistDocQry.pl?544373250123187-L
( He was one of the original indicted, and perhaps it is from seeing
too many “Law
and Order” television
shows, but the impression is he is going to turn state’s evidence
on an appeal arrangement
and thus the “early” guilty plea. editor )
Previous stories on RW Professional Leasing:
http://www.leasingnews.org/Conscious-Top%20Stories/RW_stories.htm
Hansabank
to Expand Russian Operation
Hansabank Group,
reportedly the Baltic's biggest financial services company, has announced
its plans to expand its presence in neighboring Russia
by setting up a new bank or acquiring an existing one and increasing
its leasing operations in the former Soviet Union.
The majority owner
of Hansabank is the Swedish banking group ForeningsSparbanken, which
has operated in Russia through its Hansa Leasing Russia subsidiary since
2002.
``Our primary target
is not to win a very dramatic market share but to help our clients expand
in Russia,'' Druvis Murmanis, the newly appointed head of Hansabank's
Russian operations, told The Associated Press.
Murmanis did not
specify which Russian banks Hansabank might be targeting, but he said
the new outlet would help it serve its Baltic and Scandinavian clients
and a limited number of Russian customers.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange
Rate : Europe Should Be Buying U.S.
from
Leasing Gems by Jeffrey Taylor
From an European
perspective, American assets look downright inexpensive. Weakened by
huge U.S. trade deficits and low interest rates, the dollar has plunged
32 percent since its October 2000 peak. And with merger-and-acquisition
activity heating up on both sides of the Atlantic, one might expect
a "European invasion" like the 1998-2000 spree that led to
BP-Amoco-Arco, Vodafone-AirTouch, and Daimler- Chrysler.
So why did European
companies strike only 97 first- quarter deals in the United States this
year, down from 133 in a year-earlier period when overall global M&A
activity was far weaker? Blame it on exchange rates.
Exchange rates dictate
that U.S. companies should shun European acquisitions. For example,
Home Depot CEO Robert Nardelli scotched January rumors of a possible
British deal earlier this year by calling the idea "dumb,"
and arguing that "there couldn't be a worse time to do an international
acquisition, with the euro at $1.25 to $1.28."
Lately, Americans
have moved to snap up 160 European businesses in the latest quarter-most
of them in small or midsize deals-including Yahoo's $574 million (475
million euro) offer for France-based Internet company Kelkoo.
Indeed, in dollar-value
terms, American buying of European assets is an emerging trend, building
on last year's doubling of announced U.S. cross-border deal- making
from $36.3 billion to $74.8 billion-led by General Electric's $9.5 billion
plan to buy British medical- diagnostics company Amersham.
The reasons for this
seeming flip-flop of European and American roles start with an old M&A
adage: acquisition decisions are based far more on strategy and fit
than on currency values.
"While the economy
is improving, continental Europe still has some concerns going forward,"
suggests Henri Servaes, professor of finance at London Business School.
Amid slow growth, many European companies, especially those in the euro-zone,
are still restructuring to cut costs."
One problem with
buying American assets to take advantage of the weak dollar, is that
the cash flows eventually coming from the purchase must be repatriated
at the future exchange rate, which is difficult to predict.
Companies enamored
of the exchange-rate advantages of a transatlantic transaction typically
forget the risks inherent in that type of deal. Transactions are often
more complex, while presenting higher regulatory and cultural hurdles.
---
Note from Jeffrey
If you believe the
theories enumerated in the above excerpt, one could easily conclude
that to solve the world's economic problems, every country has to adopt
the same currency. As a result weak currencies would rise and strong
currencies would fall to worldwide economic equilibrium
Which currency would
you pick? Any suggestions? Please e-mail me your thoughts. I am going
to be lecturing in London at The Leasing Academy and Sorrento, Italy
for the Pan-European Leaseurope Conference this fall and would love
to hear from my readers.
email: jtaylor@executivecaliber.ws
voice: 801-299-9332
web: http://executivecaliber.ws
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equipment Sales Representative
|
Equip.
Leasing Sales Rep: Strong sales and bus. dev. skills
needed. Dev/manage portfolio, initiate bus. in upper Midwest .
3-4 yr leasing exp. www.associatedbank.com About the Company: Associated Banc-Corp is a diversified multibank holding company with $15.5 billion in total assets. Headquartered in Green Bay, Wisconsin . Associated has more than 200 banking locations across Wisconsin, Illinois and Minnesota. |
Business
Leasing News May Edition
Lessees in Bankruptcy
Declare Open Season on True Leasing
Lenders Perform Four Key Tasks in Texas Wind Energy Projects
General Aviation
Begins to Grow, Presenting Financing Opportunities
States Increase Tax Receipts, But Shortfalls Persist
Leasing 101: What
is "Revenue Recognition"?
BLN Briefs: TRIA Extension Debated; CIOs Reduce Tech Spending;
Cape Town Bill Introduced
Training Offered
Feedback;
http://two.leasingnews.org/loose_files/Bus_Leasing_News.htm
### Press Release
######################################
RAI
Announces Closing of Subsidiary's Initial Public Offering and Certain
Management Changes
Resource America
Inc.(Nasdaq:REXI) (the "Company") announced that its subsidiary Atlas America, Inc. (Nasdaq:ATLS) has completed
an initial public offering of shares of its common stock. Atlas America
sold 2,300,000 shares at a price of $15.50 per share through underwriters
Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc. and KeyBanc Capital Markets.